OWASP Top 10 Security Risks for Large Language Model Applications: Governance Essentials

The OWASP Top 10 Security Risks for Large Language Model Applications is a list of key vulnerabilities for LLM applications, covering prompt injection and insecure output handling to help teams assess sensitive data, permission boundaries, and governance checks.

What is the OWASP Top 10 Security Risks for Large Language Model Applications?

The OWASP Top 10 Security Risks for Large Language Model Applications is a risk list for common critical vulnerabilities in LLM applications, used to help teams prioritize security issues that have significant impact, are widespread, and may be exploited. It focuses not only on the model itself, but also on risks in inputs, outputs, data, components, permissions, and application integration chains.

This type of Top Ten list is more suitable as a starting point for security awareness and governance, rather than as a complete security checklist. Teams can use it to establish risk priorities, but they still need to continue threat modeling and security assessment based on their own business scenarios, data types, system architecture, and compliance requirements.

Key point: The OWASP Top 10 Security Risks for Large Language Model Applications can help teams quickly focus on high-priority issues in LLM applications, but it cannot replace a complete system for secure design, testing, monitoring, and access control.

Start by understanding large language model application security through five risk surfaces

From an engineering governance perspective, LLM security risks can first be understood according to five risk surfaces: input, output, data, components, and permissions. This makes it easier to translate risks into system design and inspection actions than simply memorizing risk names.

Risk surfaceTypical issueCorresponding focus
Input sideUser input or external content induces the model to deviate from expected behaviorPrompt injection, system instruction boundaries, trustworthiness of external content
Output sideThe system directly uses model output as a trusted resultInsecure output handling, validation before display, confirmation before execution
Data sideSensitive data is exposed after entering training, inference, or logging chainsSensitive information disclosure, data minimization, access permissions
Component sideDefects exist in models, dependencies, plugins, external tools, or integration chainsSupply chain vulnerabilities, insecure plugin design
Permission sideThe model or Agent has an excessively broad scope of operationExcessive agency, unauthorized operations, fine-grained access control

Prompt injection and insecure output handling represent the core issues on the input side and output side, respectively. The former focuses on whether the model can be induced by input content, while the latter focuses on whether the application treats model-generated content as a definite, trusted, and executable result.

Sensitive information disclosure, insecure plugin design, and excessive agency extend risk from the conversation layer to the business system layer. Once a model can access data, call tools, or trigger business operations, permission boundaries and data boundaries must be explicitly designed.

Quick overview of common risk items: start with key entries

The following organizes common risk items from a governance perspective. The focus here is not to replace formal list definitions, but to help teams turn risk names into inspectable system boundaries, data rules, and engineering actions.

Risk itemCore issueCommon focusGovernance tip
Prompt injectionInput content affects model behavior, causing the model to deviate from expected constraintsUser input, web content, document content, indirect instructionsDistinguish system instructions from external content, and reduce the impact of untrusted input on critical operations
Insecure output handlingThe application directly trusts model output and displays, transfers, or executes itOutput validation, content filtering, downstream system callsValidate, escape, approve, or require human confirmation for output to avoid direct execution
Training data poisoningTraining or tuning data is contaminated, affecting model behavior and answer qualityData sources, data cleaning, data trustworthinessEstablish data source review and quality control mechanisms
Model denial of serviceModel service availability is affected by resource consumption or abnormal requestsRequest scale, resource usage, service stabilitySet boundaries for call frequency, input scale, and resource usage
Supply chain vulnerabilitiesSecurity issues exist in models, dependent components, external tools, or integration chainsThird-party components, model sources, dependency updatesManage component sources, versions, and integration paths to reduce unknown dependency risks
Sensitive information disclosureSensitive data is exposed in training, inference, logs, or outputPersonal information, business secrets, credentials, internal dataAdvance data classification, minimized use, permission isolation, and log governance in parallel
Insecure plugin designPlugin or tool calls extend model risk to external systemsAPI calls, business operations, parameter validationLimit plugin capabilities and add validation and confirmation for high-risk operations
Excessive agencyThe model or Agent has an excessively broad scope of decision-making and executionAutomatic execution, unauthorized operations, erroneous operationsClarify permission boundaries, call scopes, and conditions for human intervention

The value of this type of risk list lies in establishing a prioritization framework. In actual implementation, teams also need to determine risk levels based on whether the application touches sensitive data, connects to business systems, has tool-calling capabilities, and allows automatic execution of operations.

What is the difference between prompt injection and insecure output handling?

Prompt injection and insecure output handling often appear together, but they focus on different risk entry points. Prompt injection is input-side oriented, focusing on how the model is induced; insecure output handling is output-side oriented, focusing on how the system uses model results.

Comparison dimensionPrompt injectionInsecure output handling
Risk entry pointUser input, external documents, web content, or other information readable by the modelModel-generated text, structured results, or tool call parameters
Affected objectModel behavior, answer direction, system instruction boundariesApplication presentation layer, business systems, databases, external APIs, or automated processes
Typical issueInput induces the model to ignore original constraints or perform unexpected tasksThe application directly executes or transfers model output as trusted content
Protection focusInput source identification, instruction isolation, context boundary managementOutput validation, escaping, approval, confirmation before execution

A simple way to judge is: if the problem occurs when the model receives information, it is usually closer to prompt injection; if the problem occurs when the system uses model results, it is usually closer to insecure output handling. Many real-world applications face both types of risks at the same time, so input-side and output-side governance must be handled together.

How do data and model-layer risks affect large language model applications?

Data and model-layer risks affect model answer quality, business judgment, data security, and service stability. For LLM applications connected to enterprise knowledge bases, user data, or internal tools, such risks especially need to be assessed in advance.

Training data poisoning affects model behavior and answer quality

Training data poisoning focuses on the trustworthiness of data sources and the training process. If malicious, incorrect, or business-noncompliant content is mixed into training or tuning data, the model may later exhibit bias, incorrect judgments, or unexpected behavior in its answers.

Governance should not only focus on model performance after launch, but also on the source, cleaning, review, and change management before data enters the model lifecycle. For high-risk business scenarios, data quality control itself is part of security governance.

Model denial of service affects availability and stability

Model denial of service focuses on application availability. LLM calls usually involve computing resources, context length, concurrent requests, and external service dependencies. If boundary controls are lacking, abnormal requests or resource consumption may affect service stability.

Teams can establish basic defenses around call frequency, input length, task complexity, resource monitoring, and abnormal traffic identification. The focus here is not simply to restrict users, but to keep the service controllable under abnormal conditions.

Sensitive data use requires prior assessment of risks and benefits

When using sensitive data in models and inference, teams need to assess risks and benefits first. Sensitive data may appear in user input, business context, retrieval results, logs, model output, or tool call parameters. Any unnecessary exposure in the chain may expand the risk surface.

Executable governance directions include:

  • Classify data and clarify which data can enter the LLM application chain;
  • Follow the principle of minimization and provide only the data needed to complete the task;
  • Set different access scopes for different users, roles, and tools;
  • Check whether logs, caches, and debugging information contain sensitive content;
  • Detect and handle risks of sensitive information exposure in output.

Engineering security challenges from supply chains, plugins, and autonomy

When LLM applications evolve from simple question answering into applications that can call tools, access databases, and connect to business systems, risks expand from model interaction to the complete engineering chain. Supply chains, plugins, and autonomy are concentrated manifestations of these engineering risks.

Supply chain vulnerabilities come from longer integration chains

Supply chain vulnerabilities may appear in models, dependent components, external tools, plugins, API services, or deployment chains. LLM applications usually rely on multiple components working together, and defects in any one link may affect overall security.

Therefore, teams need to know which models, components, and tools the application depends on, and also need to know how these dependencies are updated, who maintains them, what data they can access, and how to isolate them when abnormalities occur.

Insecure plugin design amplifies external system risks

Plugins or tool calls allow LLMs to connect to external systems, such as querying data, calling interfaces, generating operation parameters, or triggering business processes. If plugins lack parameter validation, permission restrictions, or operation confirmation, errors in model output may be transformed into real business risks.

The focus of plugin governance is not to prohibit tool calls, but to give tool calls clear boundaries: which tools can be called, which users can call them, which parameters need validation, and which operations must be confirmed by humans.

Excessive agency increases the risk of uncontrollable execution

Excessive agency focuses on whether the model or Agent has decision-making and execution capabilities beyond the necessary scope. When the system allows the model to automatically select tools, execute tasks continuously, or directly affect business state, the risks of erroneous operations, unauthorized operations, and uncontrollable execution all increase.

A more prudent approach is to layer autonomy: low-risk operations can be automated, while high-risk operations require approval or human confirmation; query capabilities and write capabilities should be authorized separately; execution permissions should not by default inherit all permissions of the user or system.

How should authentication, authorization, and fine-grained access control be implemented?

Generative AI applications need reliable authentication and authorization mechanisms, and must use fine-grained access control to manage boundaries among different users, roles, data, and tools. Especially when LLM applications touch sensitive data or external business systems, permission control cannot stop at the application entry point.

Key point: Access control mechanisms should not rely only on the LLM application logic itself. The model can participate in understanding and generation, but critical permission decisions should be handled by independent and reliable authentication and authorization mechanisms.

Access control checklist

Check itemQuestions to confirm
IdentityDo users, service accounts, and automated agents have clear identity identifiers?
RolesDo different roles correspond to different data scopes and operation scopes?
PermissionsAre queries, writes, tool calls, and operation execution authorized separately?
Data scopeIs sensitive data provided to models or tools according to the minimum necessary principle?
Tool permissionsDo plugins and external APIs restrict callable scopes and parameter ranges?
Output useIs model output validated or confirmed before entering downstream systems?
Logging chainCould inputs, outputs, retrieval results, and call parameters record sensitive data?
Change managementAre changes to models, plugins, dependencies, and permission policies traceable?

The core goal of fine-grained access control is to allow LLM applications to obtain only the data and capabilities necessary to complete tasks. For applications connected to internal systems, special attention should be paid to whether user permissions, tool permissions, and data permissions are consistent, so as to prevent the model from becoming an intermediary layer that bypasses permission boundaries.

Which check items can teams start with during implementation?

Teams can use the OWASP Top 10 Security Risks for Large Language Model Applications as a starting point for risk identification and establish a continuous assessment process, rather than treating it as a one-time compliance task. The following checklist is suitable for requirements review, architecture design, pre-launch inspection, and periodic retrospectives.

Risk identification

  • Have the input, output, data, component, and permission risk surfaces involved in the application been identified?
  • Has it been clarified which risk items are most relevant to the current business scenario?
  • Is the Top Ten list being used as a starting point rather than the only security basis?

Sensitive data governance

  • Does sensitive data enter training, inference, retrieval, logging, or debugging chains?
  • Have risks and benefits been assessed before sensitive data is used?
  • Are data classification, minimized use, and access permission isolation implemented?

Authentication and authorization

  • Are users and service accounts reliably authenticated?
  • Have fine-grained access permissions been set for different roles?
  • Is critical access control independent of LLM application logic?

Output handling and tool calling

  • Will model output be directly displayed, executed, or passed to downstream systems?
  • Are there validation, escaping, approval, or human confirmation mechanisms for high-risk output?
  • Do plugins, APIs, and external tools have clear call scopes and parameter restrictions?

Supply chain and autonomous execution

  • Are the sources of models, dependent components, plugins, and external services manageable?
  • Are component updates, permission changes, and integration changes traceable?
  • Does the Agent or automated process have excessive agency?
  • Are human confirmation or rollback mechanisms set for high-risk operations?

For large language model application governance, the most important task is to turn the risk list into system boundaries, permission policies, data rules, and engineering processes. Only when these control points are implemented throughout the application lifecycle can the OWASP Top 10 Security Risks for Large Language Model Applications truly deliver governance value.